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1. Introduction 
Energy is one of the dominant and most vital 
issues facing the world today and it will only 
continue to increase in importance in the years 
to come. This is no less true for the Member 
States of the European Union. When discuss-
ing matters relating to the EU’s energy sup-
ply, one cannot avoid the issue of its relation-
ship to Russia, which is a key player in the 
energy sector of various EU Member States. 
With regards to Hungary, this can particularly 
be seen in the area of nuclear energy and nat-
ural gas. This paper shall attempt to survey 
the planned expansion of the Paks Nuclear 
Power Plant, including its historical back-
ground and aims, with a particular focus on 
the response of the European Commission in 
relation to the Paks II project’s compliance 
with European Union law. The other issue to 
be examined relates to projects involving the 
importation of natural gas from Russia, specif-
ically the cancelled South Stream pipeline, 
and the new Turkish Stream pipeline project. 
Hungary supported the former, and has also 
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agreed to participate in the latter. Here there 
shall be an analysis of the legal matters in-
volved with the South Stream project which 
led to its eventual demise, as well as possible 
issues which might arise with regards to the 
Turkish Stream pipeline’s extension into the 
European Union. 
2. Background to the Paks II project 
At this point it is useful to briefly review some 
of the key legislation relating to the possibility 
of European Union Member States utilizing 
nuclear power. According to Article 1 of the 
Treaty establishing the European Atomic En-
ergy Community, “It shall be the task of the 
Community to contribute to the raising of the 
standard of living in the Member States and to 
the development of relations with the other 
countries by creating the conditions necessary 
for the speedy establishment and growth of 
nuclear industries.”1 Article 2(c) elaborates on 
this, stating that the Community shall “facili-
tate investment and ensure, particularly by 
encouraging ventures on the part of undertak-
ings, the establishment of the basic installa-
tions necessary for the development of nucle-
ar energy in the Community”. According to 
Article 41 of the Euratom Treaty, “Persons 
and undertakings engaged in the industrial 
activities listed in Annex II to this Treaty shall 
communicate to the Commission investment 
projects relating to new installations and also 
to replacements or conversions which fulfil 
the criteria as to type and size laid down by 
the Council on a proposal from the Commis-
sion.” Additionally, Article 103 states that 
“Member States shall communicate to the 
Commission draft agreements or contracts 
with a third State, an international organiza-
tion or a national of a third State to the extent 
that such agreements or contracts concern 
matters within the purview of this Treaty.” 
Hungarian and Russian cooperation in the 
area of nuclear energy began in 1955, with the 
signing of a bilateral agreement which led to 
the establishment of a Soviet VVER-type reac-
tor known as the Budapest Research Reactor.2 
Later, on 28 December 1966, Hungary and the 
Soviet Union signed an intergovernmental 
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agreement for the building of a nuclear power 
plant in Hungary, and the following year 
Paks, a location 100 km from Budapest, was 
selected as the site for the plant.3 The con-
struction of the Paks Nuclear Power Plant was 
Hungary’s largest industrial project of the 20th 
century.4 Between 1974 and 1987 four Soviet-
designed VVER-440/V213 units were in-
stalled at the Paks site.5 The Paks NPP is 
Hungary’s only nuclear power plant, belong-
ing to the Magyar Villamos Művek Zá-
rtkörűen Működő Részvénytársaság (also 
known as “the MVM Group”).6As of 2016, 
51.3% of Hungary’s electricity was generated 
by the Paks Nuclear Power Plant.7 
Between 2032 and 2037 the Paks Nuclear 
Power Plant’s present operational units will 
need to be shut down.8 In 2005 the Hungarian 
Parliament supported a plan to extend the 
lives of the Paks units by a further 20 years.9 
Later, in 2009 it approved in principle the 
commencement of activities relating to the 
preparation for expanding the Paks Nuclear 
Power Plant.10 This involved the granting of 
consent for the preparation of the site for new 
nuclear power plant units.11 In the Hungarian 
government’s 2011 “National Energy Strategy 
2030”, nuclear energy was listed as one of the 
key means of increasing Hungary’s energy 
independence, and that it aimed at “the long-
term preservation of nuclear energy in the 
energy mix.”12 
The Hungarian state committed to fully fi-
nance the development of two new nuclear 
reactors for the benefit of the entity known as 
Paks II (MVM Paks II Nuclear Power Plant 
Development Private Company Limited by 
Shares), which shall be the owner and the op-
erator of the new reactors.13 This involved 
Hungary entering into an agreement with the 
Russian government to build two additional 
1200 MW units at the site of the Paks Nuclear 
Power Plant.14 Specifically, the Hungarian 
government and the Russian state corporation 
Rosatom signed an intergovernmental agree-
ment (IGA) on 14 January 2014 relating to the 
financing, development, constructing and 
commissioning of these new units.15 This was 
later adopted by the Hungarian Parliament 
under the name of Act II of 2014, coming into 
effect on 12 February 2014.16 Additionally, 
Russia agreed to help Hungary finance the 
development of the Paks II Nuclear Power 
Plant through a state loan.17 This is governed 
by a financing intergovernmental agreement, 
providing 10 billion euros in revolving credit 
to be used for designing, constructing and 
commissioning the new units at Paks II.18 In 
addition to these funds, Hungary itself will 
provide up to 2.5 billion euros from the na-
tional budget for the financing of the Paks II 
development.19 
In February 2014 the Hungarian govern-
ment received notification from the European 
Commission’s Directorate-General for Energy 
that it, in the words of the Director-General, 
“did not find any element that would as of 
itself impede the application of the Euratom 
Treaty in the meaning of its Article 103.”20 
Later, in September 2015, the European 
Commission, after reviewing the documents 
submitted in relation to the Paks II project 
pursuant to Article 41 of the Euratom Treaty, 
notified Hungary that the Paks II project 
meets the Treaty’s objectives.21 However, the 
European Commission raised and examined 
two issues relating to Paks II, which were 
whether European Union public procurement 
rules had been breached, and whether the 
funding of the project could be considered as 
state aid.22 
3. Infringement Procedure 
In November 2015 the European Commission 
launched an infringement procedure against 
Hungary in relation to what it claimed was a 
lack of compliance with regards to public pro-
curement rules.23 Initially, the Commission 
claimed that the awarding of the Paks II pro-
ject to Rosatom went against Directives 
2004/17/EC and 2004/18/EC,24 both of which 
embody the principles of “transparency, non-
discrimination and equal treatment”, concepts 
which have their basis in the Treaty on the 
Functioning of the European Union.25 
Though Hungary utilized several argu-
ments in response to the infringement proce-
dure,26 it was the so-called “technical exclusiv-
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ity” argument which won over the Commis-
sion. The legislation relevant to this issue is 
Article 50 of Directive 2014/25/EU, named 
“Use of the negotiated procedure without 
prior call for competition”. The article states 
that “Contracting entities may use a negotiat-
ed procedure without prior call for competi-
tion” in certain cases. Article 50(c) states that 
“Where the works, supplies or services can be 
supplied only by a particular economic opera-
tor for any of the following reasons”, which, 
according to sub-section (ii) includes “compe-
tition is absent for technical reasons”. Section 
C goes on to elaborate on this point, stating 
that such an exception “shall only apply when 
no reasonable alternative or substitute exists 
and the absence of competition is not the re-
sult of an artificial narrowing down of the 
parameters of the procurement”. Hungary 
argued that, in this case, the awarding of the 
contract to Rosatom for the Paks expansion 
without a public procurement procedure was 
justified according to the above cited regula-
tion.27 
In November 2016 the infringement case 
against Hungary was closed.28 Lucia Caudet, 
European Commission spokeswoman, made 
the statement that "Hungary has sufficiently 
justified that the use of the so-called technical 
exclusivity exemption, which means that 
when the technical and safety requirements of 
the project can only be met by one company, it 
can be compatible with EU laws to award the 
contract directly."29 It is believed that a French 
precedent was vital in the Commission com-
ing to its decision in favour of Hungary.30 
Specifically, this involved France awarding 
the state-controlled Areva the contract to con-
struct the Flamanville 3 nuclear reactor.31 The 
Commission decided, using Article 40(3) of 
Directive 2004/17/EC as a legal basis, that in 
this case, due to the technical specifications of 
the contract, that the French government was 
justified in its action to grant Areva the con-
tract for the nuclear reactor without a public 
procurement procedure.32 
4. State Aid Investigation 
On 13 March 2014 the European Commission 
began a preliminary investigation into the 
possibility of State aid in connection to the 
Paks II nuclear power plant’s construction.33 
Later, the Commission also opened an in-
depth investigation into the Hungarian gov-
ernment’s plans to provide investment sup-
port for the Paks II project in November 
2015.34 This was according to the procedure 
set out in Article 108(2) of the Treaty on the 
Functioning of the European Union.35 The 
Commission wished to assess the issue of 
“whether a private investor would have fi-
nanced the project on similar terms or wheth-
er Hungary’s investment constitutes state 
aid.”36 According to Article 107(1) of the Trea-
ty on the Functioning of the European Union, 
“Save as otherwise provided in the Treaties, 
any aid granted by a Member State or through 
State resources in any form whatsoever which 
distorts or threatens to distort competition by 
favouring certain undertakings or the produc-
tion of certain goods shall, in so far as it affects 
trade between Member States, be incompati-
ble with the internal market.” 
The Commission Press Release37 stated that 
“The European Commission has concluded 
that Hungary’s financial support for the con-
struction of two new nuclear reactors in Paks 
(Paks II) involves state aid. It has approved 
this support under EU state aid rules on the 
basis of commitments made by Hungary to 
limit distortions of competition.”38 European 
Commissioner for in charge of competition, 
Margrethe Vestager made the statement that 
“Hungary has decided to invest in the con-
struction of the Paks II nuclear power plant, 
its right under the EU Treaties. The Commis-
sion’s role is to ensure that the distortion of 
competition on the energy market as a result 
of the state support is limited to a minimum. 
During our investigation the Hungarian Gov-
ernment has made substantial commitments, 
which has allowed the Commission to ap-
prove the investment under EU state aid 
rules.”39 These include commitments to: 
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- To avoid overcompensation of the operator of 
Paks II, any potential profits earned by 
Paks II will either be used to pay back 
Hungary for its investment or to cover 
normal costs for the operation of Paks II. 
Profits cannot be used to reinvest in the 
construction or acquisition of additional 
generation capacity. 
- To avoid market concentration, Paks II will 
be functionally and legally separated 
from the operator of the Paks nuclear 
power plant (the incumbent MVM 
Group) and any of its successors or oth-
er state-owned energy companies. 
- To ensure market liquidity, Paks II will sell 
at least 30% of its total electricity output 
on the open power exchange. The rest of 
Paks II’s total electricity output will be 
sold by Paks II on objective, transparent 
and non-discriminatory terms by way of 
auctions.40 
As with the issue of public procurement 
and technical exclusivity, in relation to State 
aid an important precedent exists that was of 
assistance in this instance, which was the 
United Kingdom’s subsidizing the new Hin-
kley Point C nuclear reactors.41 After an in-
depth investigation, the Commission ap-
proved the plan, as the UK government 
agreed to significant modifications in relation 
to the financing of the project which would 
avoid distortions of competition within the 
Single Market.42 
Despite the European Commission having 
given its official approval for the Paks II pro-
ject, opposition to it still exists within the Eu-
ropean Union. In particular Austria, which 
has a longstanding opposition to nuclear en-
ergy,43 strongly denounced the European 
Commission’s decision, with the then Vice 
Chancellor Reinhold Mitterlehner saying in 
response to the Commission’s approval of the 
Paks II plan that “Austria can’t accept that the 
European Commission considers that subsi-
dizing the construction of nuclear power 
plants is harmless.”44 Furthermore, the former 
Chancellor Christian Kern shortly before his 
electoral defeat in October 2017 announced 
that Austria would indeed file a lawsuit 
against the Commission’s approval of Paks 
II.45 On January 24 2018 the recently elected 
Austrian government led by Chancellor Se-
bastian Kurz decided to sue the European 
Commission for its decision to allow the ex-
pansion of the Paks Nuclear Power Plant,46 
and officially lodged a complaint with the 
European Court of Justice on February 22.47 
Margrethe Vestager responded that it took 
such a decision by the Austrian government 
“very seriously” and that the Commission 
was prepared to defend its decision “with the 
arguments that are in the decision.”48 Hungar-
ian Foreign Minister Péter Szijjártó stated that 
the action of the Austrian government would 
have no effect on the construction schedule of 
the two new units at Paks, with work planned 
to commence in February of this year.49 
5. South Stream 
Before exploring the issue of South Stream 
pipeline project, it is necessary to briefly over-
view the European Union’s Third Energy 
Package, as it has a direct bearing on the sub-
ject matter under examination. The Third En-
ergy Package is composed of two directives 
and three regulations.50 These include Di-
rective 2009/72/EC concerning common rules 
for the internal market in electricity and re-
pealing Directive 2003/54/EC and Directive 
2009/73/EC concerning common rules for the 
internal market in natural gas and repealing 
Directive 2003/55/EC. With regards to the 
Regulations, these include Regulation (EC) No 
714/2009 on conditions for access to the net-
work of cross-border exchanges in electricity 
and repealing Regulation (EC) No 1228/2003, 
Regulation (EC) No 715/2009 on conditions 
for access to the natural gas transmission net-
works and repealing Regulation (EC) No 
1775/2005, and Regulation (EC) No 713/2009 
establishing an Agency for the Cooperation of 
Energy Regulators. 
The Third Energy Package has as its aim 
the improvement of the internal energy mar-
ket’s functioning and the resolution of unre-
solved structural problems.51 This involves the 
unbundling of the energy sector, which refers 
to the separation of energy generation and 
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supply from network operators.52 The logic 
behind this is that without unbundling, single 
companies which both generate and sell ener-
gy, while also operating transmission net-
works, may obstruct fair competition, which is 
disadvantageous for consumers due to the 
possibility of prices thus increasing.53 In addi-
tion, the Package seeks to strengthen and 
safeguard the independent status and nature 
of energy regulators.54 
Russia is the main supplier of gas to the 
European Union,55 with Ukraine being the 
primary transit corridor through which it is 
delivered.56 The major impetus behind the 
South Stream pipeline project was the desire 
to diversify its gas supply routes and seek 
new stable transit areas in order to export its 
natural gas to other parts of Europe.57 Even 
before the present tensions between Russia 
and Ukraine, the former had an incentive to 
seek other gas supply routes to Europe which 
would avoid using Ukraine as a transit coun-
try.58 The Russian-Ukrainian relationship in 
the realm of gas has often had problematic 
dimensions. This can be traced back to the 
1990s, when there were issues relating in par-
ticular to payment and subsequent reduction 
in Russian supplies, in addition to Russian 
complaints of gas being diverted to other Eu-
ropean countries.59 A serious dispute arose in 
2006, when Russia stopped gas supplies to 
Ukraine after the latter rejected a rise in gas 
prices.60 The dispute led to the disruption in 
supply to several other countries in Europe.61 
Later, on January 1 2009 Russia cut its gas 
supplies to Ukraine, which completely came 
to a halt on January 7, the ultimate cause of 
the dispute being that by the end of 2008 the 
two countries were unable to agree to the rate 
that Ukraine should pay for the upcoming 
year and as to how much Ukraine would be 
paid by Russia in terms of gas transit fees.62 
This dispute led to over two weeks of gas 
shortages in Central and Eastern Europe.63 
In 2007 a memorandum of understanding 
was signed between Gazprom and the Italian 
Eni for the South Stream pipeline’s construc-
tion.64 The pipeline was to begin in the Rus-
sian Krasnodar region, close to Anapa, and 
was to cross the Black Sea to Bulgaria, near 
Varna.65 From there it was to go on and 
transport gas to other countries in Southern 
and Central Europe, Hungary included.66 An 
intergovernmental agreement was signed be-
tween Hungary and Russia for the construc-
tion of the pipeline on Hungarian territory67 
and was granted the status of a “national sig-
nificance project”.68 
However, in time the project came to face 
major opposition from the European Commis-
sion. In June 2014 the Commission initiated an 
infringement procedure against Bulgaria with 
regards to the South Stream pipeline, alleging 
that the IGA relating to South Stream was in 
breach of the Third Energy Package, and that 
the tendering process for constructing the 
pipeline on Bulgarian territory was incompat-
ible with EU rules relating to public procure-
ment.69 On December 4 2014 the European 
Commission said that the bilateral agreements 
for the South Stream pipeline, including the 
one signed between Russia and Hungary,70 
breached European Union law.71 Klaus-Dieter 
Borchardt, the director for energy markets at 
the European Commission, said in the Euro-
pean Parliament that “The Commission has 
looked into these intergovernmental agree-
ments and came to the conclusion that none of 
the agreements is in compliance with EU 
law”, and “That is the reason why we have 
told these states that they are under the obli-
gation, either coming from the EU treaties, or 
from the Energy Community treaty that they 
have to ask for re-negotiation with Russia, to 
bring the intergovernmental agreements in 
line with EU law.”72 Borchardt stated that one 
of the major problems relating to the South 
Stream pipeline was that in this situation 
Gazprom would be both the producer and 
supplier gas, which would go against the 
Third Energy Package’s ‘unbundling’ rules, as 
in this case there would be simultaneous 
ownership of production capacity and the 
transmission network.73 Additionally, he also 
mentioned that there needed to be assurance 
that third parties would have non-
discriminatory access to the pipeline, and that 
Gazprom did not have the right to be the only 
Daniel Haitas: Aspects of Hungary-Russia Energy Relations in the Context of European Union Law 373
 
JURA 2018/2. 
shipper, and that issues relating to the tariff 
structure needed to be properly addressed.74 
In response to these developments, Russia 
announced the cancellation of the project, 
with President Vladimir Putin stating that “If 
Europe does not want to carry out (South 
Stream), then it will not be carried out”, which 
was later followed by Gazprom head Alexei 
Miller saying that “The project is closed.”75 
The demise of the South Stream project 
cannot be separated from the difficulties that 
arose in relations between the European Un-
ion and Russia as a result of events that took 
place in Crimea and East Ukraine in 2014.76 
This led to the essential freezing of relations 
with regards to gas issues, where it even be-
came very difficult to arrange meetings be-
tween Russia and the European Union.77 The 
working group setup by the EU and Russia 
dealing with the South Stream pipeline was 
suspended, and EU decision-making in rela-
tion to such issues relating to Russian gas as 
OPAL and DG COMP was delayed.78 It is be-
lieved that this inability to reach compromise 
on regulatory matters, within the broader con-
text of events in Ukraine, led to the cancelling 
of the South Stream project.79 
In response to the abovementioned difficul-
ties that arose with regards to the construction 
of the pipeline, in November 2014 the Hun-
garian Parliament approved a law in which 
would have opened the way for the South 
Stream pipeline’s construction, which had 
stated that the sole requirement for the com-
pany constructing the pipeline would be ob-
taining the Hungary Energy Office’s approv-
al.80 After the cancellation of the project was 
announced, Hungarian Foreign Minister Péter 
Szijjártó said that “With South Stream being 
cancelled we now have to look for new ways, 
how to get new sources and new routes in 
Central Europe”.81 He stated that Hungary 
wished to store more Russian gas, having 
suggested to Russian Energy Minister Ale-
ksandr Novak that Hungary’s underground 
reservoirs could be used for this purpose.82 
The Foreign Minister believed that by storing 
more gas in Hungary it would be advanta-
geous for Hungary both economically and in 
terms of energy security.83 
6. Turkish Stream 
As a result of the cancellation of the construc-
tion of the South Stream pipeline, Russia pro-
posed Turkey as an alternative partner for the 
construction of a new pipeline which would 
bring its natural gas to the Balkans and Cen-
tral Europe.84 Turkey is one of the major recip-
ients of Russian gas, which it presently im-
ports via the Blue Stream and Trans-Balkan 
pipelines.85 On 1 December 2014 Gazprom 
and Botas Petroleum Pipeline signed a Memo-
randum of Understanding in Ankara relating 
to the construction of an offshore gas pipeline 
from Russia to Turkey across the Black Sea.86 
The Turkish Stream pipeline will stretch over 
900 kilometers from the Russkaya compressor 
station close to Anapa in the Russian Krasno-
dar region across the Black Sea to the Europe-
an part Turkey,87 reaching Ipsala on the Turk-
ish-Greek border via Lüleburgaz.88 On July 5 
2017 Hungary and Gazprom signed a deal in 
order to link the former with the Turkish 
Stream pipeline.89 The end of 2019 has been 
set as the target for achieving this, and, ac-
cording to Foreign Minister Szijjártó, linking 
up with the Turkish Stream pipeline could 
allow Hungary to import 8 billion cubic me-
ters of gas per year, which is near to the total 
consumption of the country as a whole.90 
However, after the experience of South 
Stream, Russia appears to be cautious when it 
comes to assessing the realization of the pro-
ject. Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov 
made the statement that “The growing energy 
needs of Southern and South-Eastern Europe 
could be met by the extension of the second 
branch of the Turkish Stream to EU territory. 
Many governments of EU states have shown 
considerable interest in this. We are open to 
this, but considering the unfortunate experi-
ence of the South Stream, we will start this 
work only after receiving firm legal guaran-
tees from Brussels.”91 The European Commis-
sion itself has yet to take an official position 
with regards to the Turkish Stream pipeline 
extension into the territory of the European 
374 Daniel Haitas: Aspects of Hungary-Russia Energy Relations in the Context of European Union Law
 
 
JURA 2018/2. 
Union, which would most likely come after 
specific plans and requests are put forward in 
this area.92 However, some issues and con-
cerns have already been raised. For example, 
it has been noted that any plan to extend the 
Turkish Stream pipeline into the territory of 
the European Union would mean that it 
would have to deal with EU regulations, in-
cluding the Third Energy Package.93 Further-
more, certain key figures in the EU Commis-
sion have expressed concerns. Maros Sefcovic, 
a Vice-President of the European Commission 
and leader of the “Energy Union” project has 
expressed doubts with regards to the pipe-
line’s expansion into EU territory, saying that 
there are unresolved differences between the 
EU and Russia in relation to the Third Energy 
Package, and he also questioned the viability 
of the project.94 The EU Commissioner for 
Competition, Margaret Vestager also left open 
the possibility of the issue of compliance with 
relevant EU antitrust regulations in relation to 
Gazprom’s negotiations with European states 
potentially connected to Turkish Stream, say-
ing that “All companies that operate in the EU 
market – no matter if European or not - have 
to play by EU rules.”95 
7. Conclusion 
Hungary’s dealings with Russia in the devel-
opment of the Paks II project, as well as the 
plans to participate in the South Stream and 
Turkish Stream pipeline projects show that 
despite certain disagreements and tensions 
between the European Union and the Russian 
Federation with regards to various issues, 
there are EU Member States that feel that it is 
in their own vital interest to pursue and deep-
en their relations with Russia in certain specif-
ic areas such as energy. The case of Paks II 
and the gas pipeline projects illustrate very 
clearly that with EU membership comes cer-
tain obligations and restrictions which may at 
times somewhat impede completely inde-
pendent action when pursuing relations with 
third countries such as Russia. This may also 
be seen when it comes to the sanctions that 
have been imposed on Russia as a result of 
events in Ukraine, where EU Member States 
face certain restrictions when dealing with the 
former. In the case of Paks II, certain doubts 
and opposition with regards to the project’s 
compliance with EU law were able to be over-
come. However, this was not the case in rela-
tion to the South Stream project, and it re-
mains to be seen as to how the European 
Commission will ultimately respond to the 
plan to extend the Turkish Stream pipeline 
into the territory of the European Union. 
Notes 
 
1 Consolidated Version of the Treaty Establishing the Euro-
pean Atomic Energy Community. 1 December 2009, 
https://europa.eu/europeanunion/sites/europaeu/files/docs
/body/consolidated_version_of_the_treaty_establishing_the_e
uropean_atomic_energy_community_en.pdf 
2 Rosatom: Cooperation with Hungary, http://rosatom-
centraleurope.com/rosatom-in-country/history-of-
cooperation/hu/ 
3 Ibid. 
4 Tamás János Katona: Nuclear Energy in Hungary. Hun-
garian Geographical Bulletin 2009. 58 (4). 244.  
5 Ibid. 
6 European Commission: Commission Decision of 6.3.2017 
on the Measure/Aid Scheme/State Aid S.A.38454 – 2015/C (ex 
2015/N) which Hungary is planning to implement for support-
ing the development of two new nuclear reactors at Paks II 
nuclear power station. Brussels, 6.3.2017, C(2017) 1486 final, 3, 
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/state_aid/cases/261529/261
529_1932592_684_2.pdf 5. 
7 Paks II: Why is it necessary to construct new nuclear 
power plant units in Hungary?, 
http://www.paks2.hu/en/NuclearEnergy/RudimentsOfEngin
eering/Lapok/WhyIsItNecessary.aspx 
8 Ibid. 
9 World Nuclear News: More power for Paks. 25 May 2007, 
http://www.world-nuclear-
news.org/newsarticle.aspx?id=13462 
10 László Fodor and Orsolya Bányai: Some Environmental 
Law Questions Related to the Extension of Paks Nuclear Power 
Plant. Environmental Engineering and Management Journal, 
“George Asachi” Technical University of Iasi, Romania, No-
vember 2014. Vol.13, No.11. 2758, 
www.eemj.icpm.tuiasi.ro/pdfs/vol13/no11/Full/7_677_Fodor
_14.pdf 
11 Paks II Zrt: Company Information, 
http://www.paks2.hu/en/PaksII/CompanyInformation/Lapo
k/default.aspx. 
12 Ministry of National Development: National Energy 
Strategy 2030, 2012, 11, 12, http://2010-
2014.kormany.hu/download/7/d7/70000/Hungarian%20Ener
gy%20Strategy%202030.pdf 
13 European Commission: Commission Decision of 6.3.2017 
on the Measure/Aid Scheme/State Aid, 3.  
14 MVM Paks II: Implementation of New Nuclear Power 
Plant Units, at the Paks Site, Environmental Impact Assessment 
Study, Simplified Public Summary, 19, 
http://www.paks2.hu/en/Dokumentumtarolo/SIMPLIFIED%
20PUBLIC%20SUMMARY_EN.pdf 
15 Paks II Zrt: Company Information, and Rothschild, Eco-
nomic analysis for the Paks II nuclear power project, September 
2015, 10, 
 
Daniel Haitas: Aspects of Hungary-Russia Energy Relations in the Context of European Union Law 375
 
JURA 2018/2. 
 
http://www.kormany.hu/download/a/84/90000/2015%20Ec
onomic%20analysis%20of%20Paks%20II.pdf 
16 Rothschild op. cit. 10.  
17 European Commission: Commission Decision of 6.3.2017 
op. cit. 4. 
18 Ibid. 
19 Ibid. 
20 Erdély Online: EC energy directorate vets Paks deal for 
Euratom Treaty compliance, 1 March 2014, 
http://www.erdon.ro/ec-energy-directorate-vets-paks-deal-
for-euratom-treaty-compliance/2492788. 
21 World Nuclear News: Hungary meets Euratom Treaty 
objectives for Paks II, 15 September 2015, http://www.world-
nuclear-news.org/NN-Hungary-meets-Euratom-Treaty-
objectives-for-Paks-II-15091501.html  
22 World Nuclear News: Hungary’s Paks II project clears 
procurement hurdle, 22 November 2016, http://www.world-
nuclear-news.org/NN-Hungarys-Paks-II-project-clears-
procurement-hurdle-22111601.html 
23 European Commission: November infringements pack-
age: key decisions, Fact Sheet, Brussels, 19 November 2015, 
http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_MEMO-15-
6006_en.htm. For the nature and phases of infringement proce-
dures in general, see: Ernő Várnay, Mónika Papp, Márton 
Varju, Ildikó Bartha: EU-jog a tárgyalóteremben: A tagállamok-
kal szembeni kötelezettségszegési eljárások. Budapest: Complex 
Kiadó, 2006 
24 The European Commission proposed amendments to 
these two Directives in December 2011, which led to the adop-
tion of two new Directives (Directive 2014/24/EU, which re-
pealed Directive 2004/18/EC, and Directive 2014/25/EU, 
which repealed Directive 2004/17/EC) by the Council of the 
Eurppean Union and the European Parliament on 26 February 
2014, and were officially repealed on 17 April 2017. See Europe-
an Commission: Legal rules and implementation, 
http://ec.europa.eu/growth/single-market/public-
procurement/rules-implementation_en. 
25 Ibid. 
26 This included that the IGA and the Implementation 
Agreements relating to the Paks II development fall within the 
exemption relating to international agreements contained in 
Article 22 of Directive 2014/25/EU, see European Commission, 
Commission Decision of 6.3.2017 op. cit. 43. 
27 Ibid. 
28 European Commission, State Aid: Commission clears in-
vestment in construction of Paks II nuclear power plant in 
Hungary, Press Release, Brussels, 6 March 2017, 
http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-17-464_en.htm. The 
Commission itself did not publish its official decision to drop 
the infringement procedure against Hungary, see Sara Stefani-
ni: UK, France blazed trail for Hungary nuclear deal, Politico, 
December 1 2017, https://www.politico.eu/article/hungary-
nuclear-approval-expected-thanks-to-uk-and-france-precedent/ 
29 David M. Herszenhorn, Sara Stefanini, and Nicholas 
Hirst: Questions grow over Hungarian no-bid nuclear deal, 
Politico, 18 November 2016, 
https://www.politico.eu/article/questions-grow-over-
hungarian-no-bid-nuclear-deal/ 
30 Stefanini op. cit.  
31 Ibid. 
32 European Commission (Matthias Petschke): Your 
complaint no 2007/4189 against France – direct award to 
AREVA by „Electricité de France” (EDF) of the reactor of the 
new nuclear power plant at Flamanville, Brussels, 5 December 
2008, MARKT C/2/AP/mm D(2008) 64760, 2, 
https://g8fip1kplyr33r3krz5b97d1-wpengine.netdna-
ssl.com/wp-
 
 
content/uploads/2017/01/GreenpeaceFlamanvilleCommission
Letter.pdf 
33 European Commission: Commission Decision of 6.3.2017 
op cit. 2. 
34 European Commission: State Aid: Commission opens in-
depth investigation into Hungarian investment support for 
Paks II nuclear power plant, Press Release, Brussels, 23 No-
vember 2015, http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-15-
6140_en.htm 
35 European Commission: State Aid SA.38454 (2015/C) (ex 
2015/N) – Hungary Possible aid to the Paks nuclear power 
station, Brussels, 23.11.2015, C(2015) 8227 final, 1, 
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/elojade/isef/case_details.cf
m?proc_code=3_SA_38454. 
36 European Commission: Commission opens in-depth in-
vestigation into Hungarian investment support for Paks II 
nuclear power plant op. cit. 
37 The press release states that a non-confidential version of 
the Commission’s decision will become available once the 
relevant confidentiality issues reach a resolution. 
38 European Commission: State Aid: Commission clears in-
vestment in construction of Paks II nuclear power plant in 
Hungary, Press Release, Brussels, 6 March 2017, 
http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-17-464_en.htm 
39 Ibid. 
40 Ibid. 
41 European Commission (Vestager Margrethe): Letter, 
Brussels, 6 July 2016, Ares(2016)3039407, 1, 
https://g8fip1kplyr33r3krz5b97d1-wpengine.netdna-
ssl.com/wp-
content/uploads/2016/11/VestagerLetterPaksIIStateAid.pdf 
42 European Commission: State aid: Commission concludes 
modified UK measures for Hinkley Point nuclear power plant 
are compatible with EU rules, Press Release, Brussels, October 8 
2014, http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-14-1093_en.htm 
43 Austria filed a lawsuit in 2015 with the European Court 
of Justice in response to the European Commission’s approval 
of the UK government’s state aid for the Hinkley Point C nucle-
ar plant. See World Nuclear News: Austria files action against 
Hinkley Point project, 6 July 2015, http://www.world-nuclear-
news.org/NN-Austria-files-legal-action-against-Hinkley-Point-
project-0607201502.html  
44 The Local: Austria fumes at Hungary’s Kremlin-backed 
nuclear plant, 7 March 2017, 
https://www.thelocal.at/20170307/austria-fumes-at-hungary-
kremlin-backed-nuclear-plant 
45 Phys.org: Austria to sue over Hungary nuclear plant ex-
tension, 13 October 2017, https://phys.org/news/2017-10-
austria-sue-hungary-nuclear-expansion.html 
46 Eszter Zalan: Austria sues Commission over Hungary’s 
nuclear plant, EUobserver, 25 January 2018, 
https://euobserver.com/energy/140690 
47 Euractiv: Austria sues over EU approval of Hungary nu-
clear plant, 23 February 2018, 
https://www.euractiv.com/section/politics/news/austria-
sues-over-eu-approval-of-hungary-nuclear-plant/. 
48 Zalan op. cit.  
49 TASS Russian News Agency: Construction of new units 
at Hungary’s Paks NPP to begin as scheduled – foreign minis-
ter, 24 January 2018, http://tass.com/economy/986578 
50 European Commission: Market Legislation, 
https://ec.europa.eu/energy/en/topics/markets-and-
consumers/market-legislation  
51European Commission: Market Legislation, 
https://ec.europa.eu/energy/en/topics/markets-and-
consumers/market-legislation 
52 Ibid. 
 
376 Daniel Haitas: Aspects of Hungary-Russia Energy Relations in the Context of European Union Law
 
 
JURA 2018/2. 
 
53 Ibid. 
54 Ibid. 
55 Eurostat: Energy Production and Imports, June 2017, 
http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-
explained/index.php/Energy_production_and_imports 
56 Simon Pirani and Katja Yafimava: Russian Gas Transit 
Across Ukraine Post-2019 – pipeline scenarios, gas flow conse-
quences, and regulatory constraints, February 2016, The Oxford 
Institute for Energy Studies, 
https://www.oxfordenergy.org/wpcms/wp-
content/uploads/2016/02/Russian-Gas-Transit-Across-
Ukraine-Post-2019-NG-105.pdf 
57 South Stream Transport: South Stream: Energising Eu-
rope, Presentation, Brussels, 25 May 2011, 2, 
http://www.gazprom.com/f/posts/85/290063/presentation.p
df 
58 Luca Franza: From South Stream to Turk Stream: Pro-
spects for Rerouting Options and Flows of Russian Gas to Parts 
of Europe and Turkey, Clingendael International Energy Pro-
gramme, 2015, 12, 
http://www.clingendaelenergy.com/inc/upload/files/CIEP_
paper_2015-05_web_1.pdf 
59 Jonathan Stern: The Russian-Ukrainian gas crisis of Jan-
uary 2006, Oxford Institute for Energy Studies, January 16 2006, 
2, https://www.oxfordenergy.org/wpcms/wp-
content/uploads/2011/01/Jan2006-RussiaUkraineGasCrisis-
JonathanStern.pdf 
60 BBC News:, Ukraine and Russia reach gas deal, 4 Janu-
ary 2006, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/4579648.stm  
61 Ibid. 
62 BBC News: Q & A: Russia-Ukraine gas row, 20 January 
2009,  
 http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/7240462.stm 
63 Ibid 
64 South Stream Transport: Fact Sheet: The South Stream 
Offshore Pipeline, October 2013, 2, http://south-stream-
transport.com/.../pdf/.../ssttbv_fact-sheet-south-stream-
offshore-pipeline_38_en_20121206_2%20(1).pdf 
65 South Stream Transport: Bringing Natural Gas: The 
South Stream Offshore Pipeline to Bulgaria, 4, 
https://www.south-stream-
transport.com/media/documents/pdf/en/2013/11/ssttbv_bri
nging-natural-gas_en_20131126.pdf 
66 Antto Vihma and Umut Turksen: The Geoeconomics of 
the South Stream Project, Columbia/SIPA Journal of Interna-
tional Affairs, 1 January 2016, 
https://jia.sipa.columbia.edu/geoeconomics-south-stream-
pipeline-project. 
67 Gazprom: Contract signed for South Stream design in 
Hungary, 12 December 2013, 
http://www.gazprom.com/press/news/2013/december/artic
le180286/.  
68 Ibid. 
69 Ana Stanic: EU-Russia Relations Through the Prism of 
EU Law, Global Energy Debates and the Eastern Mediterrane-
an, PCC Report 2016/1, 33, 
http://www.ealaw.eu/static/pdf/EU-Russia-Relations.pdf 
70 Intergovernmental agreements were also signed between 
Russia and Bulgaria, Serbia, Greece, Slovenia Croatia, and 
Austria. See Euractiv: South Stream victim of Crimea annexa-
tion, 23 March 2014, 
http://www.euractiv.com/section/energy/news/south-
stream-victim-of-crimea-annexation/. 
71 Euractiv: South Stream bilateral deals breach EU law, 
Commission says, 4 December 2013, 
http://www.euractiv.com/section/competition/news/south-
stream-bilateral-deals-breach-eu-law-commission-says/ 
 
 
72 Ibid. 
73 Ibid. 
74 Ibid. 
75 BBC News: Russia drops South Stream gas pipeline plan, 
1 December 2014, http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-
30283571 
76 The Moscow Times: Russia Wants EU Guarantee to Con-
tinue with Turkish Stream Development, 3 November 2017, 
https://themoscowtimes.com/articles/russia-wants-eu-
guarantees-to-continue-with-turkish-stream-59472 
77 Jonathan Stern, Simon Pirani, and Katia Yafimava: Does 
the cancellation of South Stream signal a fundamental reorien-
tation of Russian gas export policy, The Oxford Institute for 
Energy Studies, January 2015, 5, 
https://www.oxfordenergy.org/wpcms/wp-
content/uploads/2015/01/Does-cancellation-of-South-Stream-
signal-a-fundamental-reorientation-of-Russian-gas-export-
policy-GPC-5.pdf 
78 Ibid. 
79 Ibid. 
80 In this case, MVM Zrt had set up a joint venture with 
Gazprom, with the aim of constructing and the operating the 
pipeline. See Budapest Business Journal, Hungary opens the 
way for South Stream pipeline, 5 November 2014, 
https://bbj.hu/economy/hungary-opens-the-way-for-south-
stream-pipeline_87617 
81 Hungary Today: Hungary to Store More Russian Gas 
Due to Cancellation of South Stream Pipeline, 14 January 2015, 
http://hungarytoday.hu/news/hungary-store-russian-gas-
due-cancellation-south-stream-pipeline-37603 
82 Ibid. 
83 Krisztina Than and Marton Dunai: Hungary seeks gas 
options after South Stream demise, Reuters, 13 January 2015, 
https://www.reuters.com/article/us-hungary-energy-
minister/hungary-seeks-gas-options-after-south-stream-
demise-idUSKBN0KM1LW20150113 
84 Darya Korsunskaya: Putin drops South Stream gas pipe-
line to EU, courts Turkey, Reuters, 1 December 2014, 
https://www.reuters.com/article/us-russia-gas-gazprom-
pipeline/putin-drops-south-stream-gas-pipeline-to-eu-courts-
turkey-idUSKCN0JF30A20141201 
85 Gazprom: TurkStream, 
http://www.gazprom.com/about/production/projects/pipeli
nes/built/turk-stream/ 
86 Gazprom: New gas pipeline towards Turkey, 2 Decem-
ber 2014, 
http://www.gazprom.com/press/news/2014/december/artic
le208505/ 
87 Gazprom: TurkStream op. cit. 
88 Hürriyet Daily News: Russian firms give Turkish Stream 
gas pipeline details, 2 June 2015, 
http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/russian-firm-gives-
turkish-stream-gas-pipeline-details--83363.  
89 Euractiv: Hungary joins Gazprom pipeline, as Trump 
touts US LNG, 6 July 2017, 
https://www.euractiv.com/section/energy/news/hungary-
joins-gazprom-pipeline-as-trump-touts-us-lng/ 
90 Ibid. 
91 The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federa-
tion: Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov’s remarks at a meeting 
with members of the Association of European Businesses in 
Russia Moscow, October 31, 2017, 2085-31-10-2017, 
http://www.mid.ru/en/diverse/-
/asset_publisher/zwI2FuDbhJx9/content/vystuplenie-
ministra-inostrannyh-del-rossii-s-v-lavrova-na-vstrece-s-
clenami-associacii-evropejskogo-biznesa-v-rossijskoj-federacii-
moskva-31-oktabra-
 
Daniel Haitas: Aspects of Hungary-Russia Energy Relations in the Context of European Union Law 377
 
JURA 2018/2. 
 
?_101_INSTANCE_zwI2FuDbhJx9_redirect=http%3A%2F%2F
www.mid.ru%2Fen%2Fdiverse%3Fp_p_id%3D101_INSTANCE
_zwI2FuDbhJx9%26p_p_lifecycle%3D0%26p_p_state%3Dnorm
al%26p_p_mode%3Dview%26p_p_col_id%3Dcolumn-
1%26p_p_col_pos%3D2%26p_p_col_count%3D5 
92 Economics Gazette: Europe and Russia continue to speak 
in different languages for natural gas supplies, 8 January 2018, 
http://www.economicsgazette.com/europe-russia-continue- 
 
 
 
speak-different-languages-natural-gas-supplies.html 
93 Ilgar Gurbanov: Perspective for ‘Turkish Stream’ Project: 
Possible Scenarios and Challenges, Natural Gas World, 21 
January 2017, https://www.naturalgasworld.com/perspective-
for-turkish-stream-project-possible-scenarios-and-challenges-
35401 
94 Ibid. 
95 Ibid. 
JURA
A Pécsi Tudományegyetem Állam- és Jogtudományi Karának tudományos lapja
Tartalomból
RÓZSÁS ESZTER: Kései búcsúzó
STUDIUM
AMBRUS ISTVÁN – KOVÁCS GÁBOR – NÉMETH IMRE: Az önvezető járművek kapcsán felvethető általános büntetőjogi 
problémák
BESSENYŐ ANDRÁS: Létezett-e visszterhes letét a római jogban?
BIRÓ ZSÓFIA: A történeti alkotmány alapjai. Közjogtörténetünk alakulása 1222-től az 1867. évi osztrák-magyar kiegyezésig
BORDÁS MÁRIA: A liberális demokrácia felemelkedése és bukása Magyarországon 1.
CSERVÁK CSABA: A „független szervek” közigazgatásáról
DRINÓCZI TÍMEA – PETRÉTEI JÓZSEF: Az alkotmányelmélet, az alkotmánytan és az összehasonlító alkotmányjog, 
valamint módszereik helyzete a magyar alkotmányjog-tudományban
GÁL ISTVÁN LÁSZLÓ: A gazdasági büntetőjog szerepe a költségvetés büntetőjogi védelmében – 1. rész
GÁSPÁR GABRIELLA: Adomány és úsítás – egy birtok példáján
JULESZ MÁTÉ: Az egészséghez való jog
JUSZTINGER JÁNOS: A magyar adóigazgatás története a XIX–XX. században I.
ILDIKÓ KOVÁCS: Certain issues of the integration of savings cooperatives in the light of the Fundamental Law of Hungary
LENTNER CSABA: A jegybanki szabályozás konvergenciája – történelmi szemelvények a magyar gyakorlatból a kétszintű 
bankrendszer visszaállításától a 2013-as jegybanktörvény elfogadásáig
PETRÉTEI JÓZSEF: „Államszervezési és kormányzási kihívások Magyarországon az Alaptörvény hatályba lépését követően – 
Összefoglaló tanulmány”
SIKLÓSI IVÁN: Fejezetek a „pacta sunt servanda”-princípium történetéből
SZILOVICS CSABA: Adózói jogok és kötelezettségek szabályozásának elméleti és gyakorlati problémái
SZŐKE GERGELY LÁSZLÓ: Gondolatok a hazai titokvédelmi szabályozás rendszeréről
ZOLTÁN VARGA: The role of the local land committee in administrative lawsuits
Evolution of the local land committee in terms of procedural law, investigation of the client position and legal standing in the 
administrative lawsuit
VINCZE MARTINA: Az elővásárlási jog a magyar magánjogban
COLLOQUIUM
BARANYAI MARCELL: Alternatív vitarendezési módok az angolszász jogi kultúrában
BÁRÁNDY GERGELY: Civilek és az állam. Törvényalkotási kronológia 2014-2018
BÓDINÉ BELEZNAI KINGA: Mozaikok az országgyűlési gyorsiroda múltjából
FILÓ ERIKA: A gyámságról és a gondnokságról
GESZTEI LÁSZLÓ: Az önvédelemhez való jog nemzetközi jogi szabályozása II.
GYURIS ÁRPÁD: A reasonable fogalma az angol magánjogban, különös tekintettel a szerződési jogra
HÁGER TAMÁS: Az ítéleti tényállás megalapozottsága és megalapozatlansága a büntetőügyben
DANIEL HAITAS: Aspects of Hungary-Russia Energy Relations in the Context of European Union Law
HÁMORI ANTAL: Fogyasztói jogok érvényesülése hatósági eljárásban 1.
JÓZAN FLÓRA: Gondolatok az adatvédelmi tisztviselőről
RENÁTA KÁLMÁN: Do not steal my childhood – or how to regulate the child marriage phenomenon through international law
KECSKÉS ANDRÁS – BUJTÁR ZSOLT: A kriptovaluta ökoszisztéma európai uniós és svájci szabályozásának 
összehasonlítása
KECSKÉS ANDRÁS – HALÁSZ VENDEL: A bennfentes kereskedelem (insider trading) szabályozása az Egyesült Államokban
KOVÁCS-SZAMOSI RITA – VARGA JÓZSEF: Javaslat a magyar magáncsőd intézményének átalakítására egyes nemzetközi 
példák tapasztalatai alapján
KOZÁK TAMÁS – NESZMÉLYI GYÖRGY IVÁN: Trendek, trendváltások a kereskedelemben
BETTINA NYIKOS: Manifestations of negligence in local legislation
PÁPAI-TARR ÁGNES: Az elkövető személyének és/vagy személyiségének jelentősége a büntetőjogi szankció alkalmazásában
POMÁZI PIROSKA: A magyar közjegyzőség történetének áttekintése 1949-ig
RAB HENRIETT: A versenyszektor foglalkoztatását ösztönző mechanizmusok bemutatása
SISKA KATALIN: A török emigráció hatása a török állampolgárság szabályozásának történetére
STRÉDA ANTAL: Fúziókontroll alkalmazása válságba jutott európai uniós pénzügyi intézményeknél
TATÁRNÉ GYÖNGYÖSI JOHANNA: Dizájner babák, avagy az emberi génállományba való beavatkozás bioetikai és jogi 
kérdései
AD HOC
BUBORI NÓRA BEÁTA – FEKETE KRISTÓF BENEDEK: Beszámoló a „Jelen és jövő” c. állatvédelmi konferenciáról
FÁBIÁN ADRIÁN: Évnyitó beszéd
NOCHTA TIBOR: Velem maradó emlékek Lábady Tamásról
SZÉCSI ANDRÁS: „Julesz Máté: Orvosi jog működés közben. A hálapénztől a kártérítésig”
24. évfolyam
2018. 2. szám
